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Abstract  1 
Agri-cooperatives play an important role in helping resource-poor farmers reach high-value 2 
markets. In addition to linking smallholders to markets, cooperatives provide their members 3 
with various services, such as extension, credit, input subsidies, and social programmes. While 4 
the literature contains many examples of success, there has been limited discussion on the often 5 
long and turbulent process by which cooperatives develop over time and the viable options for 6 
shortcuts. This study examines four emerging cocoa cooperatives in Peru to determine their 7 
overall business viability, the key factors that advanced their development, and their capacity to 8 
address the needs of their members. Our findings suggest that strategies for supporting 9 
cooperative development have largely failed to address major internal weaknesses and the 10 
challenges posed in the external environment. The cooperatives have received time-bound, 11 
uncoordinated, and often small-scale, interventions, which have focused on infrastructure 12 
expansion and technical assistance. Important areas related to business management and 13 
governance structures, trust relationships with buyers, and sufficient working capital have 14 
largely been ignored. Shortcuts may be achieved through improvements in access to business 15 
development and financial services, deeper engagement by private sector to support the 16 
development process, and commitment by stakeholders to monitoring and critical reflection for 17 
strategy refinement. 18 
 19 
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 2 
Introduction 3 
Strong agri-cooperatives can play an important role in helping resource-poor farmers reach high 4 
value markets, such as those for certified coffee and cocoa. These markets typically offer 5 
attractive prices and more secure buyer relationships, but require that smallholders commit to 6 
deliver pre-identified volumes on time and in the required form and quality. Cooperatives 7 
realise economies of scale in processing and marketing and provide advisory and other services 8 
to help their members respond to buyer demands. Such services include technical assistance, 9 
training, and input and credit provision. Cooperatives also manage relations with downstream 10 
buyers, certification agencies, governmental entities, NGOs, as well as with farmers, who must 11 
perceive benefits from their participation. Many NGOs and governments support cooperative 12 
development because of its potential to help achieve poverty reduction and encourage 13 
members’ sense of empowerment through stronger links to markets. Cooperatives are also 14 
considered to be effective options for advancing conservation goals (Kruijssen et al. 2009), 15 
promoting products of cultural and economic importance (Devaux et al. 2009), and discouraging 16 
the production of illicit crops (Spellberg and Kaplan 2010). Although cooperatives may not 17 
incorporate the poorest of rural populations (Bernard and Spielman 2009), they often include 18 
households of limited means that struggle to meet their basic needs throughout the year.  19 
In recent years, the literature on cooperative development in Latin America has debated the 20 
role of cooperatives in value chains (Stattman and Mol 2014, Poole and Donovan 2014, Beuchelt 21 
and Zeller 2013) and in strengthening rural livelihoods (Bebbington 1996, Valkila and Nygren 22 
2010, Donovan and Poole 2014, Bacon 2015). These studies present cases of one or more 23 
mature cooperatives engaged in an export market, which overcame adversity to evolve into a 24 
business organization able to offer attractive marketing terms and provide additional services to 25 
their members. Success is often attributed to external support, a strong market orientation, and 26 
the consolidation of democratic governance structures. Studies have also confirmed that 27 
cooperative development tends to involve considerable resources and development processes 28 
over prolonged periods, even under favourable external conditions (Donovan, Stoian and Poole 29 
2008, Poole and de Frece 2010). Frequently, the process is marked by periods of growth 30 
followed by crises due to incompetence, corruption or bad luck, leading to prolonged periods of 31 
limited activity or dissolution (Kachule, Poole and Dorward 2005). Important questions remain 32 
about how to reduce the high costs and risks associated with building cooperatives into viable 33 
businesses. This implies an explicit strategy for supporting less-mature, or emerging 34 
cooperatives, which have weaker member fidelity and governance structures, smaller market 35 
volumes and fewer buyers, and may receive less support from governments and NGOs.  36 
In Peru, government agencies and NGOs have considered cocoa cooperatives to be important 37 
partners in expanding the country’s cocoa sector and have carried out numerous interventions 38 
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and programmes in support of cooperative development (del Castillo 2013). This study explores 1 
the circumstances facing four emerging cocoa cooperatives in San Martin, Peru—the largest 2 
cocoa producing department in the country. Despite having been organized for 10 years or 3 
longer, they have yet to reach a critical ‘take-off’ point: in respect of membership number, level 4 
of capital endowment and buyer contacts they are still ‘emerging’, unlike the more consolidated 5 
group of cooperatives in Peru or elsewhere in Latin America. Section ‘Cooperative assessment 6 
framework’ provides a brief overview of debates surrounding organizational performance and 7 
introduces the framework for the assessment of the emerging cooperatives that was applied in 8 
this study. Section ‘Case study background’ provides an overview of the cocoa sector in Peru. 9 
Section ‘Methodology’ explains the methods used for data collection. Section ‘Results’ presents 10 
the results of the assessment. The paper ends with a discussion of the implications of the 11 
findings for the design of strategies to better support cooperatives, including potential shortcuts 12 
for achieving sustainable cooperative development. 13 
 14 
 15 
Cooperative assessment framework        16 
Researchers have long recognized the “dual nature” of cooperatives—a result of being both a 17 
member-controlled organization and subject to economic constraints similar to those of other 18 
enterprises. However, developing-country cooperatives that are engaged in high value markets, 19 
in addition to building appropriate governance structures, must often provide long-term 20 
support, such as technical assistance, technology development, and credit, to their members 21 
(Donovan et al. 2016). In many cases, cooperatives may represent the only source of support for 22 
resource-poor members looking to expand their production and respond to stringent quality 23 
requirements. The costs for service provision often are covered partially through subsidies 24 
provided by projects, government agencies, and, in some cases, downstream buyers. In this 25 
way, cooperatives have taken on a role similar to that of NGOs. At the same time, cooperatives 26 
must build a successful business in an altogether difficult environment, from paying taxes and 27 
competing with local buyers for raw material, to engaging with various buyers, service 28 
providers, and support organizations. Below, we briefly review the discussion on performance 29 
assessment for businesses and NGOs and then present a framework for assessment of 30 
cooperatives. 31 
 32 
Assessing cooperative performance 33 
Researchers have applied financial-based metrics to study the performance of agri-cooperatives 34 
in North America and Europe, based on the underlying assumption that cooperatives are a 35 
variant of investor-owned firms. These studies assess performance (e.g. liquidity, solvency and 36 
efficiency) based on financial ratios, where differences in ratios reflect differences in goals and 37 
related strategies (e.g. McKee 2008). In the absence of good management and accounting data 38 
they have also applied nonfinancial measures to assess cooperative performance. In the early 39 
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1980s, Babb and Boynton (1981) recommended the assessment of cooperatives based on 1 
household-level measures (prices received and access to services); investor-related measures 2 
(financial performance ratios and processing costs); and consumer/society-based measures 3 
(taxes paid, disposal techniques, and quality). Molnar et al. (2007) compared the performance of 4 
community-forest enterprises across countries based on production activities (e.g. volumes, 5 
sales, and employment), profitability, social, and environment benefits (e.g. improved forest 6 
management). Kachule, Poole and Dorward (2005) considered cooperative performance in 7 
terms of economic inclusion (ability to achieve scale, leverage of market power, and efficiency) 8 
and social inclusion (capacity building, democratic governance, and gender equity), and the 9 
influence of the business environment on performance. These are not easily measurable 10 
indicators. Various authors have also highlighted the role that social capital plays in determining 11 
cooperative performance (Sexon and Iskow 1988, Bernard and Spielman 2009). Where previous 12 
state intervention in cooperative organization has fostered a climate of mistrust among 13 
smallholders, Ruben and Heras (2012) boiled down cooperative performance to matters of 14 
bonding social capital (i.e. cooperatives’ ability to establish and maintain trust, confidence, and 15 
commitment among members). In a similar vein, Uphoff and Wijayaratna (2000) identified 16 
bonding social capital as key to good performance and efficiency in farmer organizations in Sri 17 
Lanka. Arguably these performance dimensions are even less easy to measure. 18 
 19 
Assessing NGO performance 20 
The organizational theory literature contains a rich debate on NGO performance, although 21 
applications are limited in number. Lusthaus et al. (2002) advocated a four-dimensional 22 
framework, focusing on organizational performance (effectiveness, efficiency, relevance); 23 
external environment (political-legal context and markets); motivation (history, culture, and 24 
incentives); and capacity (leadership, structure, human resources). Similarly, Lecy, Schmitz, and 25 
Swedlund (2011) conceptualized performance as revolving around NGOs’ ability to achieve 26 
stated goals, mobilize resources, or garner favourable reputation, as considered by external 27 
informants and organizational stakeholders. Some have argued that NGO effectiveness is 28 
socially constructed, where the meaning of effectiveness changes over time and where different 29 
stakeholders judge effectiveness differently (Herman and Renz 2008). The openness of 30 
organizational boundaries implies that NGO effectiveness depends on the effectiveness of other 31 
organizations and people and the ways in which they are interconnected (Scott 2004). The use 32 
of such diffuse parameters may be a reason why economic sustainability has been elusive. 33 
Donors increasingly require NGOs to undertake assessment of their activities with quantifiable 34 
metrics. However, the dilemma facing NGOs is that current donor-imposed structures for 35 
performance impact monitoring and assessment have not encouraged organizational learning 36 
and capacity building (Newcomer et al. 2012, Stoian et al. 2012).     37 
 38 
Framework for assessing cooperative capacity 39 
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No widely adopted framework has yet emerged which considers the unique features of 1 
cooperatives in developing countries, thereby limiting our ability to build on prior studies and 2 
highlight results that are complementary or contradictory. Our framework assumes that agri-3 
cooperatives pursue three general objectives: (1) improve productive capacity and wellbeing 4 
among members, (2) build an economically viable and responsive enterprise; and (3) improve 5 
the broader environment in which members live (e.g. community development and 6 
environmental protection). While there is some overlap among the three objectives (e.g. 7 
meeting expectations at the household and community levels), each can be considered such a 8 
vital element of cooperative operations. Achieving these goals implies that cooperatives build 9 
their capacities across four domains (Fig. 1): (1) physical capital, such as infrastructure, 10 
machinery, and tools used to collect, transform and market agricultural products; (2) financial 11 
assets and flows, which include liquidity, the capacity to purchase raw material from members 12 
and meet long-term investment needs; (3) trust and reciprocity in relations, including those with 13 
members, buyers, government agencies, certification agencies, and NGOs; and (4) internal 14 
governance and culture, which captures issues related to leadership, strategy, and member 15 
involvement in planning and oversight. These goals determine cooperative capacity, which is 16 
measured by effective response to the needs of its stakeholders, namely smallholder members; 17 
the internal management dimension; and the value chain, comprising of upstream suppliers and 18 
downstream buyers. Various external factors also influence the growth and development of 19 
cooperatives, including political level environment, international market trends, and local 20 
competition for raw material.    21 
 22 
Figure 1. Framework for cooperative assessment 23 
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 1 
 2 
Case study background  3 
Only 20 years ago the Peruvian cocoa sector was in a state of near collapse. Over 50% of the 4 
national area under cocoa had been abandoned. Farmers faced serious disease problems (e.g. 5 
witches’ broom, frosty pod, and black pod) and received limited state support. In addition, 6 
terrorism and social turmoil hindered investment in the sector. Peru had become a net importer 7 
of cocoa, unable to meet the needs of its relatively small domestic processing sector (Krauss and 8 
Soberanis 2001). However, around 2005, prospects began to change thanks to improved 9 
political and economic conditions at home and political turmoil in Côte d'Ivoire—the world’s 10 
largest cocoa producing nation. These conditions provided strong incentives for cocoa buyers to 11 
reconsider sourcing from Latin America. Meanwhile, there was a growing urgency within Peru 12 
and among bilateral donors in incentivizing producers to abandon coca production in favour of 13 
alternative crops, including cocoa (Chauvian 2010). Large-scale interventions by the Peruvian 14 
government, the United Nations, and bilateral donors in the late 1990s and early 2000s became 15 
a major driver of cocoa expansion.  16 
Between 2001 and 2013, cocoa production in Peru increased by over three fold, from 23,600 MT 17 
to 71,800 MT (table 1). During the same period, the area of cocoa production expanded and 18 
productivity increased, largely due to the wide availability of the high-yielding, disease-resistant 19 
cocoa varieties. With prices more than doubling, the total value of production (in nominal USD) 20 
increased 7.5 times. Peru’s recent rise in the global cocoa market is strongly linked to third-party 21 
certification systems, such as Fairtrade, UTZ Certified and Rainforest Alliance. In 2011, Peru 22 
ranked as the second largest producer of certified cocoa in Latin America (following the 23 
Dominican Republic) (FAST 2012). In 2013, certified production accounted for nearly 35% of the 24 
nation’s total production volume (Potts et al. 2014). As production expanded, so too did the 25 
number of cocoa cooperatives. In San Martin four cocoa cooperatives were founded in the 26 
1990s by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and hundreds more were 27 
created nationally by the USAID-led Peru Alternative Development Program (PDA) in the early 28 
2000s. Many of these were relatively small in terms of membership and sales volume and relied 29 
highly on external support for carrying out basic operations (Cabiese 2010, Tenorio 2011).  30 
 31 
Table 1. Cocoa in Peru, by volume and value, 2001-2013  32 
Year Production (mt) Productivity (kg/ha) Price (USD/mt) 
Total value 
(1000s USD) 
2001 23,672 517 1,088 25,764 
2002 24,354 495 1,779 43,327 
2003 24,214 486 1,753 42,449 
2004 25,920 509 1,551 40,195 
2005 25,257 502 1,538 38,847 
This is the accepted version of: Jason Donovan, Trent Blare & Nigel Poole (2017): Stuck in a rut: emerging 
cocoa cooperatives in Peru and the factors that influence their performance, International Journal of Agricultural 
Sustainability published by Taylor & Francis. For published version and citation: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14735903.2017.1286831 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23699/  
 8 
2006 31,676 558 1,594 50,493 
2007 31,388 525 1,952 61,275 
2008 34,005 534 2,581 87,759 
2009 36,804 555 2,889 106,317 
2010 46,613 604 3,133 146,038 
2011 56,500 671 2,978 168,269 
2012 62,492 683 2,392 149,470 
2013 71,838 736 2,690 193,244 
% change 
2013/2001 203.5 42.4 147.2 650.1 
Source: MINAGRI, AGRODATAPERU 1 
 2 
Methodology 3 
Four emerging cooperatives in San 4 
Martin were selected for this study 5 
(Fig. 2). Each had existed for various 6 
years prior to data collection, but 7 
had exhibited relatively low 8 
membership levels and sales 9 
volumes. Interviews with key 10 
informants and cooperative 11 
representatives were used to select 12 
the cooperatives. All the 13 
cooperatives were initially 14 
organized with external support 15 
and had obtained third-party 16 
certification for cocoa. They also 17 
differed in important ways (Table 1) 18 
related to membership numbers, 19 
sales volume, and market 20 
orientation. The membership base 21 
of the cooperatives was similar. 22 
Most members were relative 23 
newcomers to cocoa production 24 
and maintained small cocoa plots of 25 
nearly three hectares, despite 26 
having much larger landholdings. 27 
 28 
Data collection sought information 29 
on the context and cooperative 30 
Figure 2. San Martin and its provinces, with sampled 
cooperatives located in shaded provinces 
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capacity through structured and semi-structured interviews with cooperative leaders and with 1 
actors such as members, NGOs, and buyers who maintained direct relations with the 2 
cooperatives. The multi-dimensional approach allowed us to target specific questions to those 3 
with direct knowledge of the issue at hand and to triangulate information provided by other 4 
actors. A three-person research team collected data from each cooperative in 2015 on specific 5 
aspects of cooperative performance and the context: 6 
1. evaluation of financial performance, through interviews with managers, key employees, 7 
and accountants 8 
2. governance structures, through focus group meetings with the board of directors, and 9 
semi-structured interviews with managers, cooperative employees, buyers, support 10 
agencies, government officials, and second-tier organizations 11 
3. cooperative membership through structured interviews 12 
 13 
The member households were selected using a stratified random sampling method 14 
corresponding to the geographic distribution of the members and weighted for gender to 15 
ensure women were deliberately selected. The interview data included socio-economic 16 
characteristics, farming practices, and participation in, communication with, services offered by, 17 
and member satisfaction with the cooperative. In total, 130 members, roughly 26% women, 18 
were interviewed with a minimum of 30 interviews in each cooperative. 19 
 20 
Table 2. Characteristics of sampled cooperatives and their membership  21 
 Characteristic Coop1 Coop2 Coop3 Coop4 
Cooperative level 
Year established  2001 2008 2001 2007 
Members (2014) 133 200 160 307 
Major initial source of 
support  
PDA Church and 
municipal 
government 
NGO PDA 
Direct export  No Since 2013 No Since 2014 
Buyers of cocoa (2014) 2 national 
buyers (100%) 
 
1 international 
buyer (50%) 
1 national buyer 
(50%) 
 1 national 
buyer (100%) 
1 international 
buyer (40%) 
4 national 
buyers (60%) 
Cocoa marketed (MT) 2012: 223 
2013: 200 
2014: 200 
2012:150 
2013: 250 
2014: 425 
2012-13: No 
data 
2014: 210 
2012: 220 
2013: 250 
2014: 280 
Certifications UTZ 2015 Fairtrade 2013 
UTZ 2014 
Organic 2014 
Rainforest 
2014 
Fairtrade 2014 
Organic 2014 
Rainforest 2014 
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UTZ 2014 
Membership level (average 2014) 
Membership length (yrs) 8.9 3.8 4.4 5.3 
Years producing cocoa 7.6 6.1 5.8 7.7 
Farm size (Ha) 13.7 15.5 10.6 7.5 
Land in cocoa 
production (Ha) 
3.1 3.5 2.7 3.4 
Cocoa productivity 
(kg/Ha) 
565 672 687 631 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
Results 6 
Coop1 7 
Internal governance: Coop1’s manager operates with little oversight from the board. The 8 
manager alone conducts the financial planning for the cooperative and has developed the 9 
strategic and operational plans, which the board approved without providing any inputs. To 10 
support the cooperative’s transition to a viable enterprise, the regional government has paid the 11 
manager’s salary, thus allowing for the manager to potentially have divided loyalties between 12 
the government and members. Several members and the board of directors indicated during the 13 
interviews and focus group that they trust the manager’s capacity to lead the cooperative, 14 
despite the manager having little formal training in business management. Much of the 15 
members’ trust in the manager is based on interactions when the manager served as an 16 
agricultural extensionist in the community. The board of directors lacks the business acumen to 17 
evaluate the manager’s recommendations and provide strategic guidance. The board members 18 
readily admitted that they do not understand the cooperative’s financial statements.  19 
Member relations: Coop1 membership is primarily comprised of indigenous tribes (90%) whose 20 
primary livelihood activity is fishing. Since the peak fishing time coincides with the cocoa 21 
harvest, they tend to have limited labour available for managing cocoa plantations, which has 22 
impacted the productivity of the farms. In Coop1, the members’ cocoa plantations are the least 23 
productive of the four sampled cooperatives, with output at 565 MT of cocoa per hectare on 24 
average. Nearly all members stated that their engagement with Coop1 was motivated by the 25 
perceived benefits from the services Coop1 provides. In 2015, Coop1 offered technical 26 
assistance, organic certification, payment advances and organic fertilizer. Members expressed a 27 
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sense of loyalty to Coop1 because of their long history of interacting with the cooperative. The 1 
members on average had belonged to the Coop1 for nine years—roughly twice the average 2 
length of membership in the other cooperatives, extending back to when the farmers began 3 
growing cocoa. Coop1 provided 96% of the farmers with the resources to establish their cocoa 4 
plantations.  5 
Infrastructure, machinery, and tools: In 2012, Coop1 constructed seven collection centres 6 
supplied by the smaller, neighbouring communities to dry and ferment cocoa. These 7 
investments have lowered transportation costs by providing centralized collection points and 8 
have allowed Coop1 to ensure high quality product. PDA and the regional government provided 9 
nearly all the material at a cost of around 225,000 USD for construction. In addition, the regional 10 
and local government donated the land for the collection centres. The only property purchased 11 
by the cooperative with its own funds is its administrative office, which is valued at around 12 
12,000 USD. In 2014, Coop1 received donations from the anti-drug agency of the Peruvian 13 
government to purchase chocolate-making equipment worth about 23,000 USD. The machinery 14 
has yet to be used. The rest of the operational equipment used by the cooperative, computers, 15 
electric scales, a motorcycle, and cocoa quality measuring tools were purchased using a loan of 16 
4,500 USD provided to the cooperative from its first buyer in 2011. 17 
Buyer relations: Since Coop1 began selling cocoa it has sold to two large brokers and Coop2. 18 
Relations between Coop1 and one if its brokers terminated when Coop1 failed to fully repay the 19 
buyer-provided loan in 2011. The cooperative still sells cocoa to the remaining broker, although 20 
the broker has voiced frustration with Coop1 in failing to meet deadlines and delivery quotas. 21 
However, the buyer prefers to purchase cocoa from cooperatives, as the middlemen are even 22 
less trustworthy and supply poor quality cocoa. Coop1 does not have certification and has faced 23 
a disadvantage of competing with local intermediaries in the low margin commodity market. 24 
However, starting in late 2015, it was expected to be able to market UTZ certified cocoa, as the 25 
farmers will have completed the four-year transition period. In the focus group interviews, the 26 
board of directors of Coop1 expressed hope that their ability to obtain price premiums from 27 
certified cocoa would allow them to fully cover their costs and pay members higher prices.  28 
Financial assets: The regional government pays the salary of the manager and accountant and 29 
PDA also pays for the extensionists, organic certification, and organic fertilizers provided to the 30 
farmers. External funding was so critical to Coop1’s survival that it stopped buying cocoa for a 31 
period in 2013 when these funds were temporarily unavailable. Coop1 faces difficulties to 32 
service its outstanding debt of nearly 400,000 USD. Cocoa buyers provide Coop1 with much of 33 
its operational capital, which is repaid when the cooperative delivers cocoa to the buyer. In 34 
2010, Coop1 received a loan from a long-time buyer, but chose to sell its cocoa to an 35 
intermediary that offered a higher price, never paying back the original loan of 195,000 USD. It 36 
has only been able to pay the interest on this original loan. Since then, Coop1 has taken out a 37 
loan in 2013 worth 125,000 USD from the other international buyer, which it has since repaid. In 38 
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2014, it received three loans totalling 189,000 USD. One worth 34,000 USD was provided by an 1 
NGO, another for 38,000 USD was from Coop2, and the third was given from a local lending 2 
agency for 117,000 USD. To help repay its delinquent loan to the international buyer, Coop1 was 3 
considering selling its administrative office that it owned, the rest of its infrastructure having 4 
been given in concession.  5 
 6 
Coop2 7 
Internal governance: Over the last three years, Coop2 has gone from near bankruptcy to 8 
exporting cocoa with plans to become profitable in a year or two. According to its members, 9 
board of directors, local governmental officials, the fortunes of Coop2 changed in 2012 when 10 
the cooperative hired a new manager who had experience working in one of the largest cocoa 11 
cooperatives in San Martín. Because of this history, the members of Coop2 trust the business 12 
judgement of the manager. Even though the cooperative has a capable board of directors, which 13 
included a retired teacher, a banker, and a former extension provider, almost all the 14 
recommendations made by the manager are accepted; and he makes all the operating 15 
decisions. The board knows that the membership will back the manager in any disagreement. 16 
The manager feels like he has taken the role of ‘training’ the board members in their roles and 17 
how to run a cooperative. This reality of a mentor/mentee relationship has made the 18 
cooperative heavily dependent on the manager. 19 
Member relations: Following a financial crisis (see discussion on financial assets), the manager 20 
insisted that the cooperative generate sizable revenue streams before investing in social 21 
programmes. However, this plan was not well received by members. Some believed that since 22 
the cooperative experienced improved financial conditions it should invest in services and pay 23 
dividends, even though Coop2 remained unable to recover costs without external subsidies. In 24 
fact, 47% of the membership in Coop2 thought it needed to provide more services, which was 25 
nearly double the response, 24% of the membership, in the other three cooperatives. The 26 
manager and president of the board of directors explained that one of their greatest challenges 27 
was helping the members understand the financial statements. Despite concerns over benefit 28 
distribution, none of the members interviewed in Coop2 planned to leave (between 10% and 29 
20% of the members in the other cooperatives were planning on leaving). These members also 30 
sold over 70% of their harvest to the Coop2 in 2014. This fidelity can be attributed to the great 31 
turnaround the cooperative had made and the hope that Coop2 would become more profitable 32 
in the future. Several others expressed support for the cooperative because of its potential role 33 
in rural development.  34 
Infrastructure, machinery, and tools: Coop2 lacked adequate infrastructure and equipment, 35 
limiting its potential to expand. While the other cocoa cooperatives in the area had new offices, 36 
storage facilities, and post-harvest equipment, fermenting and drying facilities, provided mainly 37 
by donors, Coop2 rented a cramped office and warehouse. The only infrastructure given to 38 
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Coop2 by donors, PDA and local governmental institutions, was five collection centres in the 1 
villages at a cost of nearly 65,000 USD. However, the fermentation bins built in these centres 2 
were poorly constructed and rotted within a few years of being built. Now, Coop2 is diverting a 3 
portion of its income to rebuild these centres. The administrative and warehouse building is 4 
small, which limits its ability to purchase larger volumes of cocoa. Since it rents the building, it 5 
has no incentive to expand and improve it. The only renovation the cooperative undertook was 6 
to replace a leaky roof. It lacks the assets it needs to transport the cocoa from the buying station 7 
to its warehouse. It only owns a cargo motorcycle and an off-road motorcycle, bought with its 8 
own funds at a cost of nearly 5,000 USD. The municipal government provided the rest of the 9 
equipment, computers and other office machines and laboratory tools, at a cost of nearly 10 
25,000 USD. 11 
Buyer relations: The previous manager did not have well-established relationships with the 12 
buyers, which limited his ability to enter into contracts with the buyers. At one point Coop2 had 13 
its warehouse full but had failed to establish timely contracts with buyers to provide the money 14 
it needed to finance its loans. It nearly defaulted on its loans even though the value of the cocoa 15 
in store was more than enough to cover its payments. The cooperative now has developed 16 
strong relations with buyers and creditors, which has created the level of trust they need to 17 
work with Coop2. All the buyers interviewed explained the main motive for buying from Coop2 18 
was that they trusted the manager. The largest buyer of the cooperative explained that even 19 
though the cooperative did not always meet contract deadlines the manager communicated 20 
well and could be counted on to eventually deliver the product. This difference in the 21 
relationship the cooperative had with its buyers was a principal factor in why the cooperative is 22 
now financially stable.  23 
Financial assets: Coop2’s inability to sell cocoa combined with high interest loans from local 24 
credit institutions to secure working capital proved nearly fatal. Coop2’s first loan in 2010 was 25 
from a local credit union for 40,000 USD. However, the cooperative defaulted on this loan in 26 
2011. The former manager and president of the board of directors took out formal loans in their 27 
own name in 2011 of nearly 10,000 USD (3% monthly interest rate) to cover operating expenses. 28 
When the new manager took over, he secured informal loans, which added up to nearly 20,000 29 
USD for 6 months (5% monthly interest rate). The manager also worked to have the 2010 loan 30 
refinanced; however, the 2011 loan taken out by the previous manager was no longer 31 
recognized by the cooperative. By 2013 access to finance improved when credit was obtained 32 
from three of the cooperative’s largest buyers for a total of nearly 200,000 USD without 33 
interest, which was repaid in cocoa. By 2014, having paid back the buyer-provided loans, the 34 
cooperative gained access to international lenders, securing 100,000 USD with an 11% annual 35 
interest rate. Coop2 has also greatly increased the amount of cocoa it markets from 130 metric 36 
tons in 2012 to 425 metric tons in 2014. In fact, in 2014 it made a profit of 250,000 USD (from a 37 
loss of 10,000 USD in 2010), which was used to pay for organic certification and eliminate past 38 
debts.   39 
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 1 
Coop3 2 
Internal governance: Coop3 stopped purchasing cocoa at the end of 2014. It started purchasing 3 
cocoa again in mid-2015 after replacing its management and leadership. The NGO that has 4 
supported the cooperative and its major buyer demanded the manager be changed as a 5 
condition of maintaining a relationship with the cooperative. The membership also chose a new 6 
board that no longer consisted exclusively of farmers but was made up mostly of teachers from 7 
the local school. The members hope that the new directors would be able to provide greater 8 
oversight and guidance to the manager. The board of directors basically manages the 9 
cooperative and has been integral in establishing operational procedures. The board has taken 10 
charge of external relations with funders, and participates in the strategic planning of the 11 
cooperative. The new manager is not from the community nor has worked there. Even though 12 
he understands the Peruvian cocoa industry, he lacks the social capital necessary to engage 13 
effectively with members: management-member relations are effectively governed not by the 14 
manager but by the board.  15 
Member relations: The manager and board of directors admit that the cooperative needs to 16 
build trust first with its members and second with the buyers and the institutions that support it 17 
in order to become sustainable. Some of the members interviewed in remote communities were 18 
unaware that Coop3 remained active in the cocoa sector. Even with all the recent problems, 19 
84% of the members interviewed still planned to participate and sell to the cooperative once it 20 
started buying again. The members felt that the cooperative paid higher prices, so it was in their 21 
interest to sell to it when they had the opportunity. There was a general expectation that the 22 
cooperative would be successful now that the cooperative had new leadership, even 23 
anticipating that the cooperative will soon be exporting. One common member comment was 24 
that “…with the new board of directors and manager, things are going to change”. 25 
Infrastructure, machinery, and tools: Coop3 possessed facilities to process up to 50 metric tons 26 
of cocoa a month, more than twice the capacity it marketed in 2014. The local government gave 27 
the cooperative the building and land. The post-harvesting infrastructure in the headquarters 28 
and three collection facilities in the outlying communities were provide by grants from the local 29 
and national governments and PDA totalling 75,000 USD with an additional 5,000 USD provided 30 
by its members. The scales and cargo motorcycle worth 3,000 USD were provided by the 31 
national and local governments. PDA gave Coop3 11,000 USD worth of chocolate making 32 
equipment that it has used only infrequently.  33 
Buyer relations: Since Coop3 has been selling cocoa in 2012, it has sold to six buyers. In 2014, it 34 
sold 200 metric tons of cocoa to a national buyer and 10 metric tons to a specialized organic 35 
trader. The cooperative is trying to re-establish relationships with some of its earlier buyers. 36 
However, buyers are waiting to see if Coop3’s new management can be trusted in ensuring the 37 
cooperative meets its contractual arrangements with its current national buyer, who was the 38 
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exclusive buyer of the 2015 crop. One of the largest Peruvian cocoa cooperatives, which in 2012 1 
was the primary buyer from the cooperative, is assessing Coop3’s performance and quality 2 
control before entering into a renewed business relationship. Even with these challenges, Coop3 3 
has maintained its current buyer, who not only pays a premium for certified cocoa but also pays 4 
for the certification. 5 
Financial assets: The cooperative in late 2014 had defaulted on nearly 20,000 USD of debt, half 6 
of which dated back to 2012. At that time a neighbouring cooperative provided an interest free 7 
loan worth nearly 33,000 USD that was supposed to be repaid in cocoa. When the new 8 
management took over, 8,000 USD of this debt still had not been paid and an additional loan of 9 
10,000 USD with a monthly interest rate of 3% provided by a local credit union in early 2014 was 10 
in default. Each member in late 2014 was required to pay Coop3 nearly 150 USD to cover 11 
administrative costs. After discontinuing marketing in September 2014, this infusion of capital 12 
allowed the cooperative to once again begin to purchase cocoa by the end of March 2015. Even 13 
though Coop3 was able to make a margin on the cocoa it marketed, the former manager did not 14 
keep records of the administrative and marketing costs, so the actual profit or losses for the 15 
cooperative are unknown. The new management reported to have redoubled its efforts to 16 
maintain good records, as input for more effective marketing strategies and financial planning.  17 
 18 
Coop4 19 
Internal governance: Like Coop2, Coop4 stands out for achieving a degree of commercial 20 
success: it has been able to market a significant volume of cocoa although it has yet to become 21 
financially independent. Its former manager, who had previously worked for a PDA program, 22 
played a leading role in the cooperative’s organization and elaborated its strategic plan. He 23 
made nearly all decisions with little oversight from the board of directors. The new manager, 24 
who started work in 2013, does not have this history with Coop4. Thus, the board has adopted a 25 
more prominent role in decision making, especially in developing operational policy and 26 
financial decisions. The board members have had accounting training, which has allowed them 27 
understand the cooperative’s finances, but have made little input on Coop4’s strategic plan. 28 
Relations with members: Although Coop4 did not receive noticeably higher prices from local 29 
buyers, there was a consensus that engagement with the cooperative forced other buyers to 30 
pay higher prices for their cocoa and apply fair trading practices (e.g. use of correct scales). Even 31 
with the intense competition, the members still sold 62% of their harvest to the cooperative. 32 
One of the founding members clearly demonstrated this loyalty to support Coop4: “We need 33 
the cooperative so that we can receive fair prices. Its competition ensures that the middlemen 34 
cannot cheat us”. To become financially self-sustaining (see discussion on financial assets), 35 
Coop4 must increase cocoa sales by adding members or capturing more cocoa from its current 36 
members. They hope to double the amount of cocoa marketed in 2015 to 500 MT and then to 37 
1000 MT by the end of 2019. However, being able to commercialize this amount of cocoa will 38 
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likely be a challenge considering that Coop4 faces a very competitive environment. Every major 1 
cocoa broker in Peru has a buying station in the community where it operates. The competition 2 
is so fierce that major buyers offer Coop4 members above market prices in an attempt to gain 3 
their business. 4 
Infrastructure, machinery, and tools: In 2012, Coop4 built new offices and storage facilities and 5 
purchased processing equipment and vehicles. PDA and local and national government paid 6 
170,000 USD for the buildings and the cooperative provided the additional 90,000 USD. Coop4 7 
took out a loan from a local credit union to finance the project. Additionally, between 2009 and 8 
2013 PDA and regional government paid over 100,000 USD for 2 trucks, 3 cargo motorcycles, 9 
and 3 off-road motorcycles. Coop4 contributed around 10,000 USD to supplement the grants in 10 
purchasing this equipment. An additional 10,000 USD was donated by PDA to purchase 11 
computer equipment. Like many cooperatives in the region Coop4 has been given chocolate-12 
making equipment. While much of this equipment has fallen into disuse because of the difficulty 13 
in making chocolates and the lack of markets and expertise, Coop4 has seen this equipment as 14 
providing a real opportunity to sell into a value added market. It received a grant from PDA to 15 
hire a chocolatier to train members in making the product.  16 
Relations with buyers: This intensively competitive environment may be a factor in Coop4’s poor 17 
relationship with buyers. At times, Coop4 has not met its contractual obligations, especially 18 
deadlines, and does not communicate well with the buyers. The awkward sales relationship is 19 
demonstrated by the fact that even though one buyer explained that it would no longer 20 
purchase from Coop4 the manager still said that the cooperative was actively selling cocoa to 21 
this trader. The change of management may have also strained these relations, as the former 22 
manager made contracts the new manager found disadvantageous. Furthermore, the leadership 23 
of the cooperative believes that it can now directly export cocoa and no longer needs to be 24 
dependent on the large buyers. So, they have little interest in maintaining and building these 25 
relationships.  26 
Financial assets: The large amount of support it has received from PDA and the Peruvian 27 
government has helped the cooperative maintain financial stability. Nearly all of the staff, 28 
except for the accountant, were paid from grants. To cover all these administrative costs, the 29 
management estimated that it would need to market 520 MT of cocoa, much more than the 280 30 
MT marketed in 2014. The leadership is hopeful that it can meet this target by 2017. Coop4 like 31 
the other cooperatives has faced challenges in servicing its debts. Its original loan with a 32 
regional credit union to purchase land and help construct its main buildings totalled 115,000 33 
USD with a 2% monthly interest rate. In 2013, Coop4 borrowed an additional 18,000 USD from a 34 
different credit union with a 2.2% monthly interest rate for working capital. In 2014, a large 35 
national coffee and cocoa cooperative lent Coop4 100,000 USD and in 2015 130,000 USD for 36 
working capital that would be paid off with cocoa sold to the larger cooperative. In 2014, Coop4 37 
was unable to pay off its original loan for its land and buildings and has been working to 38 
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refinance the loan. Because of the high interest rates, the debt has increased from 115,000 USD 1 
in 2012 to 130,000 USD by mid-2015. 2 
 3 
Looking across the cooperatives   4 
Figure 3 presents the primary motivation reported by members for joining their cooperative. In 5 
some cases, the primary motivation strongly reflected the influence of the external 6 
organizations that led the process that established the cooperative. For example, Coop1—where 7 
members showed a strong interest in access to production inputs—was started by PDA with the 8 
intent to expand smallholder cocoa production. Similarly, organizers of Coop4 explicitly aimed to 9 
provide cocoa growers with an alternative to unproductive trading relationships with local 10 
buyers, thus the relatively strong interest in better prices. Interestingly, Coop4 is the only case 11 
where access to better prices did not feature as the most important reason for cooperative 12 
participation, likely reflecting the strong influence of NGOs in promoting cocoa expansion over 13 
business development. Furthermore, the cooperatives are likely to face difficulties to change 14 
expectations in the near future: the inability of the cooperatives to purchase their members’ 15 
cocoa ranked as the most important reason for members of Coops 2-4 and the second most 16 
important reason for members of Coop1 (Fig. 4) to sell cocoa outside their cooperative.  17 
Table 3 compares outcomes for each cooperative across the five parameters. The cooperatives 18 
had most advanced in their expansion of infrastructure, equipment, and tools. This could be 19 
expected given that external interventions prioritized their support to cooperatives in physical 20 
capital. The parameter where the cooperatives least advanced was in the consolidation of buyer 21 
relations. Major issues existed related to noncompliance with contracts and weak trust between 22 
buyers and cooperative managers—issues that, left unaddressed, are likely to severely impede 23 
the development process. Mixed outcomes resulted for the remaining three parameters. The 24 
governance structures varied considerably in practice. The board itself took critical decisions in 25 
Coop3 while managers with limited member involvement administered the other three 26 
cooperatives. Evidence suggested that limited business skills, specifically in Coop1 and Coop4, 27 
contributed to weak partnerships with buyers. Overall, the cooperatives were able to retain 28 
members, particularly by offering their members access to services, and in some cases, higher 29 
prices than those paid by the intermediaries, and more transparent purchasing practices. 30 
However, the cooperatives’ dependence on external funding sources will likely challenge their 31 
capacity to meet demands over time, at least for services such as technical assistance. Across 32 
the cooperatives financial capacities appeared frail. On one hand, they secured funds through 33 
buyers and lenders. Contracts with buyers, expanding cocoa production, and overall favourable 34 
world cocoa have encouraged lenders to provide credit to the cooperatives, which is used to 35 
purchase members’ cocoa. On the other hand, the level of credit for operations was insufficient 36 
and the cooperatives lacked their own capital, leaving them with limited capacity to purchase 37 
members’ cocoa.  38 
 39 
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 1 
 2 
Figure 3. Primary motivation of members to join cooperative  3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
Figure 4. Primary motivation of members to sell their cocoa outside the cooperative (2014)  7 
 8 
 9 
 10 
Discussion and Conclusion 11 
Mature cocoa cooperatives have emerged that are able to provide a range of services for their 12 
members, with important implications on rural livelihoods and rural landscapes. They have 13 
positioned themselves in global value chains, able to interact over time with international 14 
buyers eager for access to certified and otherwise high value cocoa and other commodities. 15 
Extensive support from NGOs and donors, and in some cases international buyers, has played an 16 
important part in the success of these cooperatives. As noted by Bebbington, Quisbert, and 17 
Trujillo (1996) in their study of the cocoa cooperative “El Ceibo”, “the achievements of Ceibo 18 
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have not come cheaply, and remind us that building capacity in a campesino [sic] organization 1 
require significant and sustained investment of resources” (p. 203). Similarly, the Ghanaian 2 
cocoa cooperative Kuapa Kokoo was an early participant in certified cocoa markets and received 3 
significant support from NGOs and international cocoa buyers over many years (Nelson et al. 4 
2013). Both these cases depict a pattern whereby development organizations and buyers picked 5 
a favoured cooperative supported ‘their organization’ over time, through thick and thin. The 6 
pattern is not unique to cocoa, and has endured despite the risks, as even well-established 7 
cooperatives face critical operating vulnerabilities (e.g. departure of key staff, and limitations to 8 
broaden their impact by incorporating new members and gaining critical mass in terms of 9 
marketed volumes (Poole and Donovan 2014). However, such an approach falls short in a 10 
context characterized by expanding cocoa production and buyer presence and the emergence of 11 
dozens, if not hundreds, of small cooperatives looking to expand membership and participate in 12 
markets for products that are certified or otherwise of high quality.  13 
This study examined four emerging cooperatives in the rapidly expanding Peruvian cocoa sector 14 
in an effort to understand the circumstances that have shaped their development and gain 15 
insights into options for improved strategies for supporting cooperative development. Each 16 
cooperative had a set of strengths and weaknesses, and the precise analysis differed from one 17 
organisation to another–with none of them exactly alike. In general, however, the cases 18 
analysed here fell way short of meeting performance objectives. These findings reinforce the 19 
significance of key elements of cooperative structure and strategy depicted in Figure 1 of 20 
human, social, physical and financial enterprise assets: a common performance failing is the 21 
difficulties of financial management, which are handled differently by each of the cooperatives. 22 
Working capital and access to affordable finance affects capacity to provide advance payments 23 
to members and provide services to members over the long term, and thus impacts on 24 
stakeholder relationships, particularly members and buyers. It is evident also that the 25 
expectations of members vary between the different cooperatives, but whatever part other 26 
objectives play in members’ participation, the cocoa price matters. Secondly, governance 27 
models are a significant performance dimension, in particular the different levels of respective 28 
skills and the power relationships between the boards of directors, the management and the 29 
membership. The consolidation of governance allows for building good relationships with 30 
external buyers in competitive product and finance markets. Finally, trust and good 31 
communication are key factors in building bonding social capital. In the face of intense 32 
competition from independent cocoa buyers, cooperatives will grow and consolidate their  33 
This is the accepted version of: Jason Donovan, Trent Blare & Nigel Poole (2017): Stuck in a rut: emerging 
cocoa cooperatives in Peru and the factors that influence their performance, International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability published by Taylor & Francis. For published 
version and citation: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14735903.2017.1286831 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23699/  
 20 
Table 3. Summary of viability assessment across cooperatives (+++=strong capacity; ++emerging capacity; +weak capacity) 1 
Cooperative Governance Member Relations 
Infrastructure, Equipment & 
 Tools 
Buyer Relations Financial Assets 
Coop1 
Assessment: +
 
 Lack of business training or 
experience of leadership 
 Externally paid manager 
(regional government) makes 
all major decisions 
 Board has little knowledge of 
operations 
Assessment: ++ 
 Expectation of future 
benefits motivates 
participation & sales 
 Weak sense of ownership of 
the cooperative 
Assessment: +++ 
 Adequate buildings to store and 
process cocoa 
 Lack of transport for cocoa 
purchases from members  
 Access to office space, but lack of 
title prohibits ability to use 
buildings as loan guarantee 
 Underutilized equipment for 
production of processed cocoa  
Assessment: + 
 Failure to fulfil contract 
requirements 
particularly timely 
delivery at times never 
fulfilling contracts  
Assessment: ++ 
 Access to credit through 
international provider, but 
difficulty with repayment  
 In default on a loan backed by a 
major buyer 
Coop2 
Assessment: ++ 
 Externally paid manager, 
selected and paid by projects 
 Deference to the managers’ 
decisions 
 Board of directors 
knowledgeable on daily 
operations, but limited 
impact on strategy 
Assessment: ++ 
 Members are content with 
the cooperative having seen 
its financial turn around 
 Expectations of more benefits 
as cooperative becomes 
profitable 
Assessment: + 
 Rents a main building that does 
not have adequate space 
 Rural buying stations were built 
by donors using substandard 
wood 
 Limited transportation and 
processing capability 
Assessment: +++ 
 Trust the cooperative 
because of its manager 
who has established a 
relationship with the 
buyers due to his history 
working in the industry 
Assessment: ++ 
 Manager has been able to obtain 
credit buyers & in international 
markets 
 Still lacks sufficient working 
capital 
Coop3 
Assessment: ++ 
 Externally paid manager 
(buyer) unfamiliar with the 
cooperative / unable to make 
strategic decision 
 Board effectively manages 
the cooperative while nearly 
hired manager learns his 
position  
Assessment: ++ 
 Even though the cooperative 
had stopped buying for some 
time, most members are 
hopeful for the future & 
appreciate the extension 
services they receive 
Assessment: +++ 
 Secure access to office space, 
excess capacity in warehouse and 
post harvesting space 
 Underutilized equipment for 
production of processed cocoa  
 Limited transportation capability 
Assessment: + 
 Commercial relations 
with only buyer; with 
history of incomplete 
contracts   
 Buyer purchases 
conditioned on hiring 
buyer selected manager 
Assessment: + 
 No access to working capital 
(credit) due to default and weak 
administration   
 Dependent on current buyer & an 
NGO to provide funds 
 Income from carbon credits are 
restricted 
Coop4 
Assessment: ++ 
 Board understands the 
operations 
 Newly hired, externally paid 
manager (project) has limited 
experience with the board 
Assessment: ++ 
 View cooperative as necessary 
to control prices & ensure fair 
practices 
 Side selling because of lack of 
price difference 
Assessment: +++ 
 New and more than adequate 
buildings, processing, and 
transport equipment 
 Only cooperative fully utilizing its 
chocolate making equipment 
Assessment: + 
 Extensive competition in 
the area has made the 
cooperative sceptical of 
buyers 
 Failed to meet contract 
commitments 
Assessment: ++ 
 Extensive support from donors 
 Difficulty in paying loans with high 
interest rates 
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 Still developing strategic plan 
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operations by providing members with attractive prices and useful services. Engagement by 1 
cocoa cooperatives in multiple certification systems (e.g. Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance and UTZ 2 
Certified) reflects, in part, interest in diversifying their buyer portfolio and providing more 3 
attractive terms to members.  4 
In all cases, external organizations, mainly local and regional governments and PDA-supported 5 
NGOs, played a major role in the formation of the cooperatives. However, they failed to fully 6 
address the critical needs of obtaining access to financial assets, building healthy commercial 7 
relationship and improved governance structures. External support targeted a few needs: 8 
infrastructure development and covering costs for administration, technical assistance and the 9 
provision of inputs to members. Buyers had supported the cooperatives by facilitating access to 10 
credit (either directly or by providing collateral); however, the cooperatives likely represented a 11 
high level of risk for deeper and broader support.  12 
 13 
Services provision 14 
The coops remain weak business organizations, but dependency relationships are not entirely 15 
asymmetrical. The public objective of licit agriculture such as cocoa production requires viable 16 
commercial production; and the international market needs assured supplies of high quality 17 
product, particularly as climate change is likely to affect global production. But real challenges 18 
remain in order to wean the coops off government and NGO supports which underwrite 19 
underperformance. Value chain partners need a stronger commitment to build the ‘soft’ assets 20 
associated with human skills of management and governance. Soft asset formation may continue 21 
to be necessary for years after the technical assistance, infrastructure, and financial support 22 
have been scaled down. A sectorial dialogue is necessary to ensure that the design and delivery 23 
of these services are aligned and harmonized between government policy, the approaches of 24 
development agencies, NGOs, research and training centres, and most of all, closer 25 
collaboration, communication and coordination in the value chain among cooperatives, buyers 26 
and processors. Among promising – and replicable - initiatives interlinking smallholders and 27 
collective organisations with commercial input suppliers, credit provision, output marketing and 28 
even management services are the multistakeholder partnership approach supported by the UN 29 
World Food Programme,1 and the scheme for inclusive value chain model of Standard Bank 30 
Group (Stanbic) in Africa.2 31 
 32 
Governance 33 
Well-qualified leadership is not only necessary to make critical decisions and develop a coherent 34 
strategy. The abilities of manager and directors are also important to build good relations with 35 
members and with buyers. These cases bring to light the overall lack of business leadership in 36 
                                                          
1
 https://www.growafrica.com/groups/patient-procurement-platform 
2
 http://www.inclusivebusinesshub.org/project/project-profile-stanbic-agricultural-banking-in-nigeria/ 
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rural areas and the tendency for leaders to acquire their skills through lengthy learning-by-doing 1 
processes, at times supported by training and technical assistance interventions. All the buyers 2 
commented that a key factor in choosing to do business with a cooperative is their confidence in 3 
the manager and to a lesser extent with the board of directors. This relationship with the 4 
leadership is so important that it has critically affected the survival of all the cooperatives 5 
included in this study. In Peru as in many other markets, there is a relatively small group of 6 
businesses that export cocoa. Buyers for these businesses share information on cooperative 7 
performance among themselves and are likely to ‘blacklist’ cooperatives and their managers 8 
who have shown to be unreliable business partners. Several cocoa buyers mentioned they would 9 
reconsider purchasing cocoa from Coop2 if it changed managers. Coop3’s buyer would only 10 
continue purchasing from the cooperative once the buyer installed its own manager. The leaders 11 
of Coop1 and Coop4 have failed to establish and maintain good business relationships, which has 12 
greatly limited their ability to market cocoa. In countries like Peru that have weak institutions, 13 
especially weak courts to enforce contract laws, the need for strong relationships between the 14 
buyer and the cooperative is even more critical (Hoskisson et al. 2000).  15 
 16 
Finance 17 
One characteristic shared by relatively large, successful exporting cooperatives, irrespective of 18 
the principal crop, is the amount of outside support, especially financial support, received during 19 
the incubation stage that allowed them to grow and compete. Clearly, these emerging 20 
cooperatives were unable to either offer extension services or pay for a large staff when they 21 
were first formed. The challenge lies in determining how long funding should be provided and 22 
how best to target resources. While cooperatives are likely to welcome donations and subsidies 23 
for the expansion of physical capital, including large-scale processing equipment, such 24 
investments should be made with caution unless based on sound financial planning (e.g. 25 
investment capacity for repair and expansion) and marketing strategies. The provision of 26 
chocolate-making equipment to emerging cooperatives in remote areas makes little sense in a 27 
context where the recipient cooperatives are struggling to consolidate basic business operations. 28 
Most importantly the cooperatives will not grow their membership or consolidate their 29 
administration unless they have affordable access to working capital. An effective and trusted 30 
leadership is more likely to gain access to affordable credit. However, even the most trusted 31 
manager faces challenges finding credit to make purchases because of thin credit markets in 32 
these remote settings. A coordinated effort between private industry and the government loan 33 
guarantees - as in the Stanbic case cited above - is needed to foment and subsidize these credit 34 
markets. 35 
This study, carried out in a context where cocoa cooperatives participate in a rapidly growing 36 
cocoa sector with considerable competition among local buyers, highlights the need for local 37 
stakeholders to investment in the formation of bonding social capital from the beginning of the 38 
cooperative development process. . The challenges presented here are relevant in other 39 
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contexts where efforts in cooperative building are expected to contribute to revitalizing the 1 
cocoa sector, for example Papua New Guiana (Garnevska, Joseph and Kingi 2014) and Ghana 2 
(Donovan et al. 2016). Cooperatives need strong partners along the way who understand their 3 
needs and circumstances. Government agencies and NGOs will continue to play a key role; 4 
however, there is need for deeper engagement to design monitoring systems with feedback 5 
loops for joint reflection and learning. Greater coordination with the private sector is needed to 6 
better understand the options for coordinated interventions and joint risk-sharing. For emerging 7 
cooperatives, value chain partnerships for building governance and leadership capacities will be 8 
critical. A future research and development challenge is to better understand and manage the 9 
economic incentives that drive the relationships between buyers and cooperative suppliers in 10 
value chains such as cocoa in Peru, in such a way that commercial partners rather than external 11 
donors are willing to commit the financial resources that hitherto come from donors and the 12 
public sector. Finally, new forms of collaboration, such as cooperative–cooperative business 13 
schools, may also work for newly formed cooperatives if more mature cooperatives are willing to 14 
share experiences and skills. 15 
 16 
 17 
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